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This paper examines organisational forms in the car industry, in 
order to derive stylised facts th at can be used to model the interac­
tion between firm structure and market structure. The analysis of 
the car industry since 1945 points to  a  fundamental change in pro­
duction technology, that brought about changes in organisational 
forms. A new organisational form is claimed to be emerging, and is 
defined.
'1 wish to thank Prof. S. Martin, my supervisor, for constructive comments at var­
ious stages of this work. Prof. Bianchi (Bologna University) brought precious advice, 
as well as Professors Abo and Fujimoto (Tokyo University), and managers of car com­
panies met during research trips. All remaining errors are mine. Financial support was 
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This paper addresses the issue of the effect of firm structure on mar­
ket structure in oligopolistic markets. Oligopoly theory has recently 
started to be enriched by the relaxation of the black-box assumption. 
Considerations of firm structure in oligopoly models include two main 
lines of research. First, agency models are brought into oligopoly 
models (Labory, 1997a). Second, the interaction between financial 
and production decisions are considered (for example, Brander and 
Lewis, 1986). "'’his paper considers a third line of research, namely 
organisational forms and oligopolistic competition. The study of or­
ganisational forms is an important part of the theory of the firm. An 
important contribution in this field is the theory of transaction costs, 
defined by Williamson (1975). In oligopolies, few contributions exist. 
Since the study of organisational forms lacks formal developments, 
the methodology of this study is to first analyse organisational forms 
in oligopolies, in a case study of the car industry, and then derive 
stylised facts to be modelled. Therefore, I analyse the key features 
of the evolution of the automobile industry since World War Two, 
in terms of production, demand, and technology, in order to outline 
the main structural changes that took place in the industry, and how 
both organisations and market competition evolved as a result. By 
organisation I mean the hierarchy, the relationship between the head 
office and the divisions, be they defined in terms of regions or prod­
ucts. I focus on the top level of organisations, because this is where 
strategic decisions are taken, and the link with strategic interactions 
in oligopolies is most obvious.
The major change that has occurred is the shift from the rigid Fordist 
production system to the flexible production system, initiated by 
Toyota. Toyota and other Japanese car makers experienced particu­
lar demand, financial and labour conditions after 1945 that led them 
to adopt a particular production system, producing variety at low 
cost, and a particular organisation, characterised by horizontal as 
well as vertical information flows. These turned out to be the basis 
for a competitive advantage in the 1980s.



























































































flexible production system, and adapted their organisations accord­
ingly. The major adaptation concerns relationships within and across 
firms, which appears to be leading to a new organisational form.
Since drastic changes in organisational structures occurred as a result 
of the introduction of the new technology, the hypothesis advanced 
here is that:
1. organisational forms are determined by technology and compe­
tition conditions;
2. whereas the multidivisional form of organisation was optimal 
to coordinate the activities and motivate the members of the 
Fordist firm, the shift to the flexible production system means 
this organisational form is no longer optimal. In contrast, a 
new organisational form is emerging that optimally organises 
the firm with a flexible production technology;
3. since the flexible firms’ success is persistent after rivals have 
adopted the new technology, it appears that not only the tech­
nology (implying cost advantage), but also the form  o f  organ­
isation  (information flows inside the firm) are crucial determi­
nants of firms’ long-term performance in oligopolies;
4. Changes in organisation are rare and costly and have long­
term effects. Their effect in oligopolies is to establish barriers 
to entry/exit.
The paper is structured as follows. In a first section, the general 
evolution of the car industry is analysed. The particular cases of three 
automakers, Ford, Toyota and Honda are examined, and point to a 
new organisational form that seems to be emerging in the industry. 
The latter is then defined in the last section. Conclusions are then 




























































































2 General Evolution since 1945
2.1 Producers, demand, product
The period 1945 to 1972 is characterised by a fragmentation of the 
world industry into different oligopolies, mainly the USA, Europe 
and Japan. Producers of the latter two oligopolies were concerned 
about reconstruction and recovery of post-war levels of production.
- Production
In Europe, car production reached its pre-war level only in 1950, from 
which time mass production really began. Markets expanded rapidly 
since they were at the early stages of the product life cycle. Between 
1950 and 1959, car production increased from 0.26 to 1.13 million in 
Prance, 0.52 to 1.19 in the UK, 0.22 to 1.5 in West Germany, and 0.10 
to 0.47 in Italy1, and a large part of this production was exported 
(mainly to the USA).
Japanese automakers produced only trucks and commercial vehi­
cles, in small volumes, until the mid-50s. Both Toyota and Aissan 
launched their first passenger car in 1954-55. However, the Japanese 
market remained small and production in large volumes, as in the 
USA, was impossible. Hence firms had to find ways to combine line 
production (which enables economies of scale) and small volumes. 
The strategy of Toyota was based on waste minimisation and on an 
incentive system that rewarded gains in productivity and reduction 
in production time (Ohno, 1978). Japanese producers had to cope 
with the lack of financial funds after the war and the reorganisation 
of the financial sector brought about by the dissolution of zaibatsu 
by the American authorities2. Keiretsu links with suppliers based on 
trust and cost minimisation were established. Agreements with trade
'Source: C.C.F.A. (Coinmite des G'onstructeurs Francais d’Automobile).
2 Zaibatsu were family-owned holding companies controlling large companies 
in important industrial sectors. Each zaibatsu included a bank, which provided 
funds to the members of the group. After their dissolution, new groups emerged 
without a holding company at the top, but where members are linked by cross­





























































































unions reduced the power of the workers, thereby ensuring “peaceful” 
industrial relations (Cusumano, 1988).
The strategy of cost minimisation by the reduction of waste and 
of labour and other variable costs continued even when demand in 
Japan improved. Sales of new cars in Japan surpassed sales in France 
only in 1969. The boom of Japanese production took place in the 
second half of the 1960s. In 10 years, from 1964 to 1973, the domestic 
market expanded from 0.5 to 3 million vehicles, while Japanese car 
makers production rose from 0.58 to 4.5 million cars, the difference 
being exported mainly to East Asian markets.
- Producers
The “Big Three” , that is, the main American firms, Ford, General 
Motors (GM) and Chrysler, rapidly switched from military vehicle 
production to utility vehicles and passenger cars. As early as 1947, 
car production in the USA reached the level of 1940. The American 
automobile market was large and diversified: sales varied between 
5 and 7 million cars per year. The production and variety offered 
by GM and Chrysler increased rapidly, while Ford started to signifi­
cantly enlarge its range of models only in I9603.
From 1973 onward, a number of events hit the car industry world­
wide, so that firms had to cope with increasingly similar problems. 
This corresponded to the progressive integration cf regional oligopolies 
into a worldwide oligopoly, increasing trade and foreign direct invest­
ments between the regions. Thus three major market phenomena 
have hit all car manufacturers simultaneously. These are the oil crises 
of 1973 and 1979, fluctuating exchange rates in the early-1970s and 
financial deregulation in the 1980s.
Yet problems specific to some firms or some countries were numer­
ous. The power and importance of consumer movements was typ­
ically American. In the USA, the 1970s was the decade in which 
the American automotive market internationalised. The Big Three 
averaged about 88% share of the US. passenger car market in the 






























































































were about 15% in 1970, and 22% in 1979. The mix of importers 
changed dramatically over the decade. In 1970, 8 out of the top 
10 importers were European, while in the end of the decade 6 of 
the top 10 importers were Japanese. Japanese companies expanded 
their dealership network typically by signing agreements with the Big 
Three. MMC (Mitsubishi Motors Corporation) and Chrysler, Isuzu 
and Ford, Mazda and GM signed such agreements. This enabled 
American producers to complete the range of models offered, since 
the smaller and more fuel efficient Japanese cars were sold through 
the Big Three’s outlets. This provided an easy access to the Amer­
ican market for Japanese automakers, an initial entry on the small 
car segment which was followed in the 1980s by entry on other car 
segments. American producers did not expect such subsequent ag­
gressive competition of Japanese entrants on their own segments, 
that is large and luxury cars. The decade of the 1980s therefore was 
a tumultuous decade for American car makers, since their share of 
the market fell by 9% to the benefit of Japanese automakers. Honda 
started production in the USA in 1982, and was followed by Nissan 
(1985), Toyota (with GM in the JV  NUMMI) in 1986, Mazda in 1987 
and MMC in the joint venture with Chrysler in 1989. This was ac­
companied by the setting up of about 300 Japanese parts suppliers 
on the American market.
In Europe, each firm acted as a leader in the home market and a 
follower elsewhere.
The particular problem in Japan was the financial crisis of the early- 
1990s, brought about by the collapse of the financial bubble, which 
implied a rise of the cost of investment (many banks were going bank­
rupt), exchange rates problems (the high yen reduced the scope for 
exports), and most importantly an economic recession that trans­
lated into a fall in the demand for cars and an adjustment in tastes 
(consumers no longer willing to pay for a very large variety and lux­
ury but preferring less personalised cars, in terms of options, at lower 
price), which revealed an over-diversification of the range of models 
offered by Japanese producers.
Over the years and especially in the 1990s a contradiction appears: 




























































































fine strategies on a world basis (for example by selling in every pos­
sible regions in the world), while regions keep their specificities, due 
to different cultures and mentalities, and translating into different 
consumers’ tastes, different governmental regulations, and so on. All 
car manufacturers worldwide have to face this contradiction, notably 
by adapting their organisational forms.
- Demand
In terms of demand, all major market, namely Europe, the USA and 
Japan, expanded rapidly after the Second World War, and became 
renewal markets form the 1970s onward. Nowadays all those markets 
are saturated, so that competition between producers is more intense. 
They have greater incentives to expand to newly emerging markets 
in order to compensate for this.
- Product
Product characteristics also changed. After the second oil crisis, the 
American, European and Japanese models started to converge in 
size, packaging concept, styling, and so on. International competition 
therefore became more direct in that individual models from different 
firms and regions started to compete against each other within the 
same segment of the global market. Consequently, car makers have 
accentuated their differentiation strategy, so that the product life cy­
cle has been reduced, and the cost of R&D has risen dramatically. 
Alliances among producers have therefore developed, aiming primar­
ily at spreading the cost of product development, and resulting in 
the emergence of networks of relationships between competitors.
The large variety is evidenced by the large number of models produced5, 
as well as the number of options for each model. Tables 3 and 4 below 
illustrate this point for the cases of major Japanese car manufactur­
ers. This implies a change of strategy and of the organisation of 
producers. Instead of concentrating all product development in the 
home country, it appears optimal that models be produced in the re­
3However, the number of models has an upper bound. Thus Japanese pro­
ducers recently had to reduce their number of models offered because consumers 




























































































gion where they are mostly demanded, like small cars or diesel engine 
cars in Europe, in the quantities necessary to reach the profitability 
threshold, and then sold to other markets where they may also be 
demanded. This strategy has the major advantage of good adapta­
tion of the product to local needs and tastes. In each segment (small, 
medium, large,...) producers try to maximise economies of scale by 
developing as many common features as possible for cars aimed at 
different markets. This commonisat,ion is unlikely to lead to a world 
car, that is a single car for all regional market. The reason for this 
is the specificity of each market previously outlined6.
Table 1. Range of models produced by the main Japanese  
car makers.
1984 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
Honda 12 13 13 14 14 16 16 16 18
Toyota 19 21 21 21 21 23 24 28 28
Nissan 21 20 21 22 23 26 26 23 23
Source: JAMA report, 1995.














Nissan 3 4 18 19
Mazda 2 1 7 6
Honda 3 4 1 11
Mitsubishi 4 3 6 7
Isuzu 0 0 1 3
Fuji 0 2 4 3
Daihatsu 2 1 0 5
*: Excluding very small cars, jeep-type models and cab-over vans.
Source: Clark and Fujimoto (1991, 1992), who point out that al­
though the Japanese autom akers did not spend m ore on R&D, they 
introduced many more models than Western producers (over the pe­
riod 1982-87, they introduced 70 new models, against 20 by American




























































































producers and 40 by European ones).
2.2 Technology
The automobile industry is characterised by incremental, progres­
sive innovation. The product is never changed fundamentally but 
producers incrementally improve both the production process (for 
instance, a new machine to produce bodies) and the car itself (for 
example, four-wheel drive, ABS braking system, airbags, and so on). 
Until the 1970s, the technology in the car industry was stable, as 
the structure of the industry and the organisation of firms. However, 
during the 1970s Japanese producers introduced a new production 
system7, which turned out to be a competitive advantage and all 
other producers adopted that technology. After the generalisation of 
this production system during the decade of the 1970s, the focus was 
again on product innovation and generally incremental innovations 
from the 1980s onwards. Japanese producers maintained their com­
petitive advantage (high quality, low cost, small time-to-market) even 
after rivals adopted the new technology8. I argue that the persistence 
of their competitive advantage9 is due to a particular organisational 
form, which is optimal given the new technology and intensity of 
competition.
Bianchi (1991) provides a precise explanation of the flexible produc­
tion system, in contrast to the linear Fordist system. The flexible 
system organises the production cycle so that production functions 
can be specialised without restricting them to specific products. Thus 
parts across different products are “commonised” so that differenti­
ated products are manufactured on the same line at some stages of
7 which was developed by incremental innovations over a certain time period, 
and not discovered suddenly (this was stressed by Toyota managers met during 
research trips).
8See Fujimoto (1994) for a discussion of the advantages of Japanese producers 
relative to Western producers.
9where competitive advantage is defined as an advantage affecting the long­
term position of the firm in markets, especially barriers to exit from certain 




























































































the production cycle. As a result, increasing economies of scope are 
realised without losing scale economies. Inside the firm, the fiat hi­
erarchy and integration of functions10 (marketing, research, design, 
engineering, manufacturing, etc.) increases communication between 
employees in the different departments and information flows between 
the consumer and the producer, so that the product is really fitted 
to consumers’ needs and tastes.
The mass production system invented by Henri Ford at the begin­
ning of this century dominated the car industry until the 1970s. This 
system is optimal when firms have large market power over their 
home market, face little competition and differentiation is not impor­
tant. The main elements of this model include a highly centralised 
management structure, an increasingly automated assembly line, a 
separation of activities (marketing, R&D, engineering,...), collective 
bargaining, wages based on productivity, a ready access to capital, 
a market driven by falling costs and oligopolistic competition. The 
automotive industry in the USA in particular emphasized product 
design and technology, but paid much less attention to process tech­
niques and manufacturing technology than Japanese car makers.
The adoption of this new technology by Western producers involved 
large investments in machinery in order to match the flexibility of 
Japanese producers11. However, from the late-1980s this tendency is 
reversed in favour of a refocusing on human resources, seen as the 
most important source of flexibility (defined here as the production 
of variety at low cost)12. As a result, the work force was dramatically 
reduced. Thus Ford reduced its work force by 21.6 % over the decade 
of the 1980s, while Peugeot S.A. (PSA) reduced employment by 25% 
over the period 1981-91.
Work organisation changed towards a larger participation of work­
ers. This re-organisation of product development (PD) included parts
10As stressed by Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p97).
11 For instance Fiat constructed “highly automated factories” (Camuffo and 
Volpato, 1994).
12Toyota itself built an almost entirely automated factory at Tahara, Japan, 
to confront the problem of labour shortage in Japan. This turned out to be very 
costly without the expected returns in terms of quality. Consequently, the focus 




























































































procurement policies. Thus most Western automakers experienced 
a vertical disintegration, and established partnership relationships 
with suppliers. These relationships involved some shifting of cost 
and R&D to suppliers, with quality and low price ensured by com­
paring suppliers performance, thereby inducing competition between 
them13.
The organisation of distribution also changed. The Fordist system 
has distribution systems based on exclusive dealers under the au­
thority of car manufacturers. The Toyotist system has a different 
distribution system, where dealers are involved in cost minimisation 
(reduction of stocks, manufacturing after orders,...), in quality (of 
services to the customers, especially after-sales services), and in the 
sharing of information (to better understand consumers tastes before 
developing a new product). Non-exclusive distribution has developed 
in the USA, but the practice of exclusive dealers is still widespread 
in protected markets like Europe and Japan14.
By the end of the 1980s, the technology in the automobile indus­
try seems to have stabilised once again, and producers now focus on 
product innovations as barriers to entry, to gain or maintain market 
shares. The intensification of competition in the 1980s implies the 
emergence of two key factors for success: time and creativity (for 
variety, quality and low cost). The first factor means that products 
have to be developed rapidly (in order to be the first mover in some 
market segments). The second is that frequent incremental product 
innovations have to be made in order to attract consumers. This 
raises an issue: are there organisational forms favouring rapid prod­
uct development and creativity, that is, implicitly, favouring market 
performance?
The study of particular automakers will bring more insight on this 
matter. The analysis of major changes in the organisation of Toyota, 
Ford and Honda since 1945 is presented below, and points to common 
new features of organisation adopted, that might define a new form 
of organisation.
13See De Banville (1989), De Banville and Chanaron (1991) and Baudry (1993) 
on this issue.




























































































3 The Case of Ford
Ford is an interesting case study because it experienced some dra­
matic changes following big downturns in the 1970s and late-80s. 
Ford’s long-term performance was lagging behind major Japanese 
producers like Toyota, in terms of quality, production costs, pro­
ductivity, etc. Recessions triggered changes with long-term conse­
quences, because the competitive pressure (threat of exit), is larger 
during recessions. Overall, Ford’s production system remains rigid. 
However, it has a long history of multinationalisation and has R&D, 
production and sales facilities in the three main regions in the world 
(USA, Europe and Japan), that interact. Ford has a long presence 
in Europe, which started before the second World War. In Japan, 
Ford’s introduction has been helped by its collaboration with Mazda.
3.1 Ford ’s downturns
Ford is the most internationalised car manufacturer, althoi ffi it de­
pends to a large extent on the American market, which has repre­
sented two thirds of Ford’s world revenue since 1980 (23% for Europe, 
10% for the rest of the world15).
The dependence on the American market shows that Ford’s organi­
sation is centralised, with a large part of production and sales done in 
the home country, where the head office keeps rigid control over the 
company. The American market represents about half of the world 
sales of the company. Ford has experienced three important down­
turns: in 1974-75. 1979-82 and 1990-92. The last two crises triggered 
dramatic changes in organisational structure. The reason is that or­
ganisational changes are costly and difficult to make, and are better 
accepted by the firm’s members in bad times. Thus after the second 
crisis of Ford, managers and employees accepted the introduction of 
innovations and organisational changes because they were worried 
about the possibility that the firm might not survive. The organi­





























































































methods, which Ford learned from Mazda, of which it took a 25% 
stake in 1979. Over this period a new agreement was signed with 
the trade union (UAW) with greater involvement of employees in the 
firm and wage reductions.
The extent of the changes carried out by Ford can be illustrated by 
a comparison of several indicators before and after the crisis, as in 
table 3 below.
Table 3. Changes from 1976-82 to  1983-92
Number employed -20 %
World sales + 8 %
Total cost / turnover - 2 %
Equipment +  17.9 %
Labour cost - 20,2 %
R&D spending / total cost +  4.15 %
After tax profit / turnover +  185 %*
Source: G. Bordenave, 1995, GERPISA.
* This high rate does not result only from  the inclusion o f  the eco­
nom ic recession o f  1979-82 in the first period. According to Bor- 
denave, the signs o f  variation are not changed i f  the comparison is 
limited to expansion phases o f  both periods.
This reorganisation induced a remarkable recovery at Ford. Table 3 
shows that sales grew by 8% between the periods 1976-82 and 1983- 
92. Long-term sales growth is a measure of long-term performance. 
Hence in the long-run, and beyond cyclical fluctuations in profitabil­
ity, the changes in internal organisation had a significant effect on 
Ford’s performance.
The main reason for the problems of Ford in the 1970s was increasing 
competition from Japanese producers, who benefitted from a compet­
itive advantage in terms of technology, hence quality and price. Ford 
lacked model renewal and had a range of models concentrated on the 
upper part of model range, that is large and luxury cars, whereas 




























































































were turning to smaller cars. In 1980, the small cars segment repre­
sented 64 % of the American total market16. Besides, Ford’s quality 
image was very poor. Flynn (1995) shows that in the 1970s con­
sumers reported on average 7 defects per American car, only two for 
Japanese cars. Lastly, mass production in the Fordist model had to 
be altered because the necessary increase in variety could not be met 
by a rigid production system.
An attempt was made at standardizing the car at world level, in order 
to realise economies of scale. However, this concept was a failure, be­
cause each regional market keeps specificities which have to be met, 
thereby preventing a total standardization of the car at world level. 
Ford announced the launch of a world car in 1980, the Escort, but 
the model was very different across continents, with different manu­
facturing and different parts, so that no economies of scope were re­
alised. The differences in culture across continents make this concept 
impossible to realise. Therefore, Ford launched a new concept in the 
end of the 1980s, very much like the Honda concept of “global-local” . 
It is a world car in the sense that the platform, the basic interior and 
the technology are common (standardized), as well as sometimes the 
name or even exterior design. However, different options (colour, 
number of doors, electronic system, safety systems, ...) are created 
for each market, in accordance with its specific needs. Products are 
therefore not strictly identical across regions but adapted to local 
needs. Thus the Mondeo is a “global-local” car. American and Eu­
ropean engineers have cooperated to develop the Mondeo. However 
this car is not a world car, since it is sold in the USA and in Eu­
rope with different designs and different names (Mondeo in Europe, 
Mercury-Mystique and Ford Contour in the USA).
The major organisational changes are introduced at the beginning of 
the 1990s.




























































































3.2 Changes in Ford’s organisation
After the third downturn in the early 1990s, Ford’s managers realised 
that the first changes were not enough. Several remaining long-term 
problems were identified, the solutions of which were shown to re­
quire further changes in organisation. The table below shows that 
Ford recovered from the drop in sales due to the second downturn, 
but in the long-term, sales growth was still negative in 1987 relative 
to 1978. Growth of North American car sales between 1978 and 1987 
was -20.8%.
Table 4. F acto ry  Sales, 1978 - 1987.
(Millions) 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
North America (1) 2.9 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4
World (2) 6.6 5.9 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.0 5.7 5.6 6.0 6.1
Source: Annual reports (1: cars; 2:cars and trucks).
The failure of the world car is also due to a lack of cooperation be­
tween regions. This induced a duplication of effort which contributed 
to increase the cost of product development and limited the range of 
models offered on each market. Quality was poor. A study by Baily 
and Gersbach (1995) finds that the Japanese car industry enjoyed 
a quality premium of 12% over the USA in 1987, and 16% in 1990. 
Product development was slow. For instance, it took 5 years for the 
Taurus to be redesigned, while such redesign in Japan takes only 4 
years.
In terms of organisation, top managers of Ford identified two prob­
lems: lack of horizontal communication between divisions and too 
heavy a bureaucracy, with many top hierarchical levels, and a sepa­
ration of activities without interactions.
Therefore in January 1993 Ford’s CEO decided to change Ford’s or­
ganisation in order to coordinate efforts of regional units, with a 
central worldwide management structure (against existing regional 
structures) with global goals and strategies. A two-year study was 




























































































tional structure, to be implemented in the FORD 2000 program by 
the end of this century, starting with the merger of European and 
North American automotive operations in January 1995.
As shown by the figures below, Ford’s reorganisation has two main 
aspects. One aspect is the set up of a matrix form at the prod­
uct development level. The other aspect is a large centralisation of 
activities on the American base.
Product development is now operated under a matrix form, in that 
both horizontal and vertical interactions have been established. Ver­
tically, all functions (marketing, engineering, design, manufacturing, 
etc.) cooperate to develop a specific model (large, small, medium,...). 
Horizontally, the functions of all product divisions also intersect. 
This is precisely the flexible production system, namely, a multipli­
cation of information nodes17 by developing cars in teams, where 
functions interact.
This multiplication of communication nodes for larger (more fre­
quent) information flows is generalised to the global organisation. 
This is a first major characteristic of the new organisational form 
that will be defined in greater details further on.





























































































Figure 5. Ford's organisation until the early-90s
E&VP: Executive and Vice-President 
CEO: Chairman and Executive Office 
GM: General Manager




























































































In the new organisation form, the activities of Ford’s facilities in each 
region (R&D, manufacturing, sales, etc.) are coordinated at world 
level by a centralised management, based in the USA. Also, each car 
model is managed centrally by a worldwide director. For instance 5 
Vehicle Program Centers (VPC) have been established, one located 
in Europe (small cars), and the other 4 in the USA. Each center has 
a worldwide responsibility for the vehicle assigned to it. The aim is 
to commonise (in the sense of standardizing car interior) car models 
as much as possible. However, this is evidence of a centralisation 
of powers in the USA, which raises some issues. First, the concen­
tration on the USA may lead to a lack of adaptation of models to 
regional markets, since the world directors may not assimilate per­
fectly information from each regional market. Second, since regional 
subsidiaries are given less responsibility, regional managers may have 
less incentive to provide effort and in particular may lack the incen­
tive to perfectly report local information to the head office. Thus 
European managers have expressed concerns. They fear that Eu­
rope will become a career backwater, are reluctant to move to the 
USA, and fear losing power in front of the powerful labour unions, 
in Germany in particular.
In contrast to Ford, General Motors has a policy of regional inde­
pendence for better adaptation of models to local tastes, but with 
relationships between regions in order to share experience and com­
monise as much of the vehicle as possible. GM has strong regional 
operations that develop vehicles for their own markets. Then, if a 
vehicle has strong crossover potential, engineers and marketers from 
different regions meet to suggest customizing.. Thus Cadillac will get 
an Americanized version of the Opel Omega small luxury sedan de­
veloped by Opel in Germany, while Opel will get a minivan designed 
mainly in the USA. GM managers claim that such ad hoc efforts are 
cheaper and more flexible18. As a result, the product developed in 
one region is mainly sold in that region but also sold in other re­
gions, with minor changes in design. Products are therefore truly 
“global-local” . This coherence of the organisation of the company 
which gives regional divisions the necessary autonomy (adaptation




























































































to local markets, motivation) while ensuring exchanges between divi­
sions of products and information, thereby avoiding duplications of 
effort and improving innovation, is a second characteristic of the new 
organisational form that is claimed to be emerging.
Some changes in the top hierarchy and in incentive systems have 
been carried out at Ford in order to accompany the reorganisation. 
In order to reduce bureaucracy, the number of top hierarchical levels 
has been reduced. Thus top management has been cut by 20%, and 
the span of control of remaining managers has increased. Red tape 
as well as the number of corporate committees have been reduced to 
make decision-making less costly and faster (the number of corpo­
rate committees is now 3 instead of 11). Changes in job definition 
include job rotation: engineers used to be permanently assigned to 
a department, but will now be induced to move to different func­
tions and different vehicle centers. The flat top hierarchy is a third 
characteristic of the new organisation.
As a conclusion, short-term downturns have triggered large changes 
in organisation that were made necessary by poor long-term perfor­
mance parameters. In the short-term, organisational costs (costs of 
organising activities in the firm) increase because of the costs associ­
ated with employees’ layoffs and training of personnel for new tasks 
and responsibility. Once the organisation is put in place, organisa­
tional costs reduce because contracts are more efficient, so that the 
profit of the company increases. Ford announced very clearly its 
changes. One interpretation is that this was a signal of efficiency to 
rivals so as to effectively deter entry on certain market segments.
4 The Case of Toyota
4.1 Evolution of perform ance
As noted above, the Japanese model developed due to specific con­
straints existing in Japan after WW2: low demand, lack of financial 




























































































variety while maximising economies of scale. This led to the flexi­
ble production system, that became the dominant system worldwide 
from the 1970s onward.
The analysis of Toyota is interesting for two reasons. One is that 
it enables to better understand the new system of production, and 
the reason is that it leads to an outline of the essential elements of 
the Japanese competitive advantage. Thus the Japanese competitive 
advantage would not have been what it is without the strategy of 
exports, which Japanese producers adopted very early. They were 
induced to export because of the small size of their domestic market.
Toyota’s exports and production abroad rose dramatically, especially 
in the 1980s. Exports to the USA increased from almost 800,000 
units in 1980 to a peak of 1,100,000 unit in 198619. More generally, 
Toyota’s sales abroad were higher than those in Japan over the pe­
riod 1979-1986, denoting a strong policy of long-term development 
on a world basis.
T able 5. Sh are o f exp o rts in production (passenger
1960 64 68 70 74 78 80 84 88 90
Nissan 5 24 23 29.5 50 49 53 55 45 42
Toyota 9 10 30 31 36 44 48 45 40 41
Source: JAMA
From 1986 exports fell from a total of about 2 million cars to about 
1.5 million in 1994, but this was compensated for by a rise of over­
seas production in the same period, which increased from less than 
136,300 vehicles in 1985 to 1,051,300 vehicles in 199420.
4.2 The true advantage of T P S  is flexibility, not 
just-in-tim e (JIT )
This dramatic increase in world market shares of Toyota in the 1980s 
shook Western competitors, who did not expect such a sudden rise
19Toyota, annual report 1995.




























































































of this Japanese competitor to top performance levels. Business re­
searchers therefore started to study the issue, aiming at explaining 
what they saw as the end of Western producers’ dominance and the 
start of the Japanese-led era21. Dualist theories (Japan/West, Toy- 
otism/Fordism, lean/mass, flexible/mass) developed that suggested 
Japanese superiority and the need for Western firm to adopt their sys­
tem in order to survive. The literature on Toyota is large and very of­
ten confuses the TPS (Toyota Production System) with the Japanese 
model. I think this generalisation is too restrictive: Japanese au­
tomakers have different experiences and organisations. The analysis 
of the TPS enables us to distinguish fundamental elements of the 
TPS and to avoid too rapid conclusions, especially concerning the 
opposition Japan / the West. Thus the analysis of the “just-in-time” 
principle, often claimed to be the key element of the TPS, points to 
the caution necessary when dealing with empirical analysis of firm’s 
internal organisation. Data are difficult to get, and firm managers 
might provide very subjective judgements.
According to managers interviewed at the British factories of Toyota22, 
the Toyota Production System (TPS) has three main tools, Kaizen, 
Jidoka, and Just-in-Time (JIT ). Jidoka represents features built in 
the production process that give workers the possibility to stop the 
line at any time if a fault occurs. However, Shimuzu (1995) argues 
this did not function. Workers were so pressured to raise productivity 
(with wages based on productivity improvements) that they would 
never dare to stop the whole line because of a possible defect. For 
the same reason, their participation in improvement of the production 
process was very limited. Thus Kaizen, the idea that everywhere in 
the firm employees should aim at small but continuous improvement 
in the work they do, did not really work.
J IT  is a “pull” system that makes the production process go from 
one step to the next on the production line “only in the type and 
quantities needed and at the time they are required”23. A tool of 
J IT  is the Kanban system whereby a label is put on the car being
2 ,Guillain (1969), Vogel (1979), Van Wolferen (1983).





























































































produced, indicating its characteristics (such as its colour), and the 
parts it requires (such type of seats,...), which enables workers to 
exactly know at each step of production what quantity of parts is 
and will be needed. Close relationships with suppliers are needed 
so that parts are delivered continuously in just the small quantities 
required.
Another aspect of the system is the organisation and coordination 
of relationships with suppliers. Procurement in the Japanese system 
in based on networks of subcontractors. Inside such keireitsu, sup­
pliers are financially dependent on automakers. Cross shareholdings 
between suppliers and automakers ensure the dominance of the car 
producer in the relationship. This is a key aspect of J IT  and requires 
ideally that all suppliers be located on site, as in Toyota-City. Unless 
all suppliers follow the assembler in different markets in the world, 
J IT  is not possible as a globalisation strategy.
This is how Toyota itself together with advocates of the T P S as a 
best system present its advantages. However, Toyota has recently 
reorganised its factories, due to both the shortage of labour and age­
ing of the population in Japan. It has constructed two new factories 
(Motomachi and Kyushu), where new work organisation methods are 
being tried out24. The four new features of work organisation at Toy­
ota all aim at introducing a more humane nature into work. These 
are25:
- a new wage system which puts less emphasis on productive effi­
ciency, thereby putting less pressure on workers to work ever more 
intensively (wages depend primarily on age and skills rather than on 
productivity achieved);
- new personnel management methods, including promotion, training 
(of new recruits, in order to reduce the turnover rate), skill acquisition 
(so that workers aim at gaining know-how and get more satisfaction 
in work;
- New shop floors, less dirty and more comfortable, where women 
and older people can also work;





























































































- A division of assembly lines into subgroups, which enable stocks 
between sublines and reduces work intensity.
Hence new incentives were established for a better coordination and 
motivation of the firm’s members, resulting in new relationships in­
side the firm. Besides, the reorganisation shows that JIT  is not the 
key advantage of TPS. In my view, the ke> advantage is the flexi­
bility it offers. The new factories built in locations far away from 
Toyota-City shows that Toyota is abandoning the idea that J IT  is 
a key to the T P S and requires that suppliers be on site. In fact, 
thanks to modern means of communication, proximity in space is no 
longer necessary. Toyota is flexible not only because it produces var­
ious mixes of models on assembly lines, but also because it adapts to 
the environment in which it operates. Thus Abo (1994) shows that 
Toyota has adapted to the specificities of the local markets where it 
has carried out foreign direct investments. It is also flexible in that 
it constantly aims at improving.
4 .3  Toyota’s Global Organisation
Toyota remains very centralised on the parent company in Japan, 
which retains great authority over its subsidiaries. However, the sit­
uation is changing. Thus the share of local managerial jobs held 
by Japanese is progressively reducing, and more autonomy is given 
to local employees when they are familiar with the methods of the 
company.
This progressive, although small, decentralisation of Toyota shows 
that the company is concerned with local adaptation, hence of the 
need to be “global-local” . In the USA, the NUMMI experience26 
helped Toyota understand American business and culture, so that 
the Toyota facilities set up later could adapt well to the specificities 
of the American market. In Europe, Toyota’s British manufactur­
ing plants follow the corporate goals and strategies defined at the 
Japanese headquarters, but are responsible for adapting these to the 
European reality, i.e. determining European consumers’ needs, or-




























































































ganising production, and establishing supply and distribution net­
works. This is increasingly true as the transplant integrates more to 
the local market (Abo, 1994).
Progressively, a larger autonomy is given to the regional unit, so 
that the latter can take some local strategic decisions without hav­
ing to wait for the parent company’s agreement. This will probably 
lead in the longer term to the specialisation of each regional facil­
ity in the models for which local demand is higher than that of any 
other demand. This specialisation will not prevent exchanges of both 
products (sale of a model in another region if there is a demand) and 
information (know-how, ideas), which is optimal given the present 
conditions of globalisation (need to be present in all regional mar­
ket and in all segments). This decentralisation concerns steps of the 
production cycle from production research (renewal of models and 
technology of production) to commercialisation. Basic research (on 
car of the future, new materials to be used, and so on) remains cen­
tered on Japan, because this activity is highly secret. Besides, R&D 
has been to a certain extent recently decentralised in the USA, with 
the opening of the Carlty Design Research Inc., where Japanese and 
American designers cooperate on the R&D of new designs. The new 
Previa model was developed in the USA primarily for the American 
market, and was then manufactured in Japan in a Japanese version 
called Estima. Table 6 below shows the main automobile industry 
research centers of Toyota in Japan, the USA and Europe.
Table 6. Toyota R esearch  C enters in the m ain m arkets.
Jap an
- Tokyo Design Center (research on new designs)
- Higashi-Fuji Technical Center (Research and advanced developments)
- Shibetsu Proving Ground (Vehicle testing and evaluation)
- Toyota Technical Center (Toyota-City) (Planning, design, prototype)
U SA
- Toyota Technical Center USA Inc. (testing and evaluation of new cars)
- Carlty Design Research Inc. (R&D of new designs)
Europe
- TM M E* Technical Division (research & test of car technology for Europe)
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5 The Case of Honda
Honda was a late-comcr in the car market. Having started as a mo­
torcycle producer, it had to establish a specific strategy for successful 
entry into the Japanese car market in the early-60s. This successful 
strategy had two aspects. On the one hand, Honda entered by dif­
ferentiation of its product relative to existing products, by bringing 
in a sporty image and technical advances (such as high performance 
engines). On the other hand, and unlike other Japanese producers, 
Honda immediately turned toward world markets. The share of ex­
ports in production rose dramatically, and Honda rapidly developed 
cars specific to foreign markets, especially the American one. Thus 
over the period 1990 to 1994, about 75% of Honda’s total sales were 
overseas, and about 25% in Japan. As shown by the following table, 
Honda experienced a dramatic rise of production after its successful 
entry into the car industry, from zero in 1960 to more than 1 million 
cars in 1980.
Table 7. G row th of H onda’s worldwide autom obile produc­
tion
1960-1995









Source: Honda Annual reports, JAMA.
Honda has now two car factories in Japan, at Sayama, where larger 
models (such as the Legend, Accord and Prelude) are produced, and 
Suzuka, specialised in smaller models (Civic, Concerto, Integra, To­




























































































same line. For instance at Sayama, 7 types of car body can be ac­
commodated: the basic Accord, Prelude and Legend, the two-door 
Legend, and the Accord derivative, namely Inspire, Vigor and As­
cot. This contrasts with the specialised factories of Ford. The same 
models can be made on more than one assembly line at each factory, 
thereby facilitating a balanced use of each line. This provides Honda 
with the same flexibility as Toyota, where models are produced in lots 
of one, but with the additional advantage of less complexity, since the 
logistical planning of parts supply is much easier when production lot 
size is increased.
It is interesting to outline some of the features of Honda’s organisa­
tion of production, because they are precisely the features introduced 
by Toyota during its reorganisations of the early-1990s. This points 
to some convergence of production organisations of automakers.
The labour process is less rigid than the precisely defined tasks at 
Toyota (this is what Toyota is moving to nowadays). Production is 
done in small lots of 30 to 60 vehicles, against lots of one at Toy­
ota. Honda moved to smaller lot sizes in recent years in its Japanese 
plants. Honda also emphasizes the innovative uses of production 
technologies, with an important role of its subsidiary Honda Engi­
neering.
Concerning production-market relationships, the range of models 
produced by Honda is much smaller than that of Toyota, because 
it has been centered on American style cars. Honda needs to develop 
cars more fitted to other markets. However, quality is maximised, 
as at Toyota. H.&D plays a central role: the reputation of Honda 
was built on its innovative capacity and the firm is organised so as 
to stimulate engineers’ creativity. This points to an important issue 
concerning innovation. Jacquemin (1996) argues that successful inno­
vation results from innovation considered in all its dimensions; inno­
vation is not only technological, but also financial, and, as stressed in 
this chapter, organisational. Thus the coherence of the firm’s organ­




























































































5.1 H onda’s organisation: a network
Honda’s organisation has always been peculiar. Unlike other Japanese 
companies, Honda has never been part of a business group, and did 
not maintain close relationships with the government. Thus Honda 
entered the automobile market despite the strong opposition from 
MITI.
This policy of “difference” carried over to the organisational form 
adopted. Since 1945, the organisation has been characterised by:
• an “expert system” in which creative people are encouraged 
to use their skills, without any constraints from supervisors, 
thanks to a flat organisation;
• research focused on product activities in small teams, typically 
2 to 10 people. Each team pursued competing technical solu­
tions until the most appropriate was selected;
• incentives based on ability rather than on seniority, unlik ' other 
Japanese companies;
• flat hierarchy at top level: only three tiers of management, and 
a world organisation of activities. For instance, the sales man­
ager in the American division reports directly to the manager 
of sales in Japan.
Honda has organised from the outset as a worldwide web of produc­
tion facilities, in motorcycle production as well as car production.
Concerning the organisation of the divisions, Honda conducted some 
reforms recently. In 1991, Honda split its business divisions into three 
distinct operations: automobiles, motorcycles and power products. 
In 1992, the automobile business was split into four regional opera­
tions: Japan, North America, Europe and the Rest of the World. In 
1994, another reorganisation was conducted, the whole Honda busi­
ness being no longer split between the three distinct operations, but 
only between five main regions: the Americas, Europe, Japan, Asia 




























































































divided vertically by regions, but each regional activity (R&D, man­
ufacturing, etc.) interacts horizontally with similar activities in other 
regions. Honda’s organisation can be represented as in the following 
figure, outlining both vertical and horizontal information flows in the 
company.
The divisionalisation according to regions enables Honda to adapt 
products to local tastes. Honda has three main R&D centers world­
wide, so that the local systems of Honda’s global organisation com­
prise all key activities, from production, marketing, R&D, engineer­
ing, sales. For instance in the USA, Honda-USA is developing prod­
ucts specific to the American market, which are then sold elsewhere 
in the world. HRA (Honda R&D of North America, Inc.) conducts 
market research, product planning, design, making of prototypes and 
testing. Manufacturing is carried out by Honda of America Mfg. 
(HAM), which also manufactures more than 80% of the best selling 
Accord models sold in North America. Honda Engineering North 
America (EGA) develops the production technology used by HAM. 
In 1993 was launched the Civic Coupe, the third Honda car manu­
factured exclusively in North America, following Accord Coupe and 
Accord Wagon. This enables Honda to really integrate locally, so 
that it can both better understand local demand and fully exploit 
local resources, such as local engineers’ competence.
Therefore Honda’s organisation can be defined as a global network, 
where some responsibilities are delegated to regional units, and where 
interactions between units are encouraged. Units are therefore linked 
by many routes, unlike the centralised global organisation of Ford.
This also boosts creativity since the different poles share experience. 
Thus certain experiences of Honda’s Anna engine plant in the USA, 
including in-house production of pistons and other engine compo­
nents are unique at the American plant and have been transferred 
back to Honda’s engine plant in Japan. This is evidence of recipro­
cal information flows between regions and of the setting up of local 































































































































































































5.2 A daptation to local markets
5.2 .1  H onda as fourth A m erican producer
Honda considered establishing a factory in the USA as early as 1975, 
when the boom of the Civic model was taking place. The agreement 
on the opening of a car factory in the USA came in 1979. However, 
Honda’s internationalisation started much earlier for the motorcycle 
branch, since its motorcycle plant in Belgium opened in 1962. The 
facilities for car manufacturing in North America are a dual assembly 
line automobile plant at Marysville, opened in 1982, and two single 
automobile assembly lines: one at Alliston Ontario (since 1986) and 
the other at East Liberty, Ohio (1989). These factories are charac­
terised by a rapid model changeover and mixed model production. 
The American factories produce both small and large cars, unlike 
the specialised factories in Japan. In addition, all 4 factories in the 
USA are managed together. The allocation of models to the different 
factories therefore changes over time, as shown by table 8.
Table 8. B alanced use of H onda assembly lines in the U SA.





1986 A4, A3, C4 A4
1987 A4, A2, C4 A4
1988 A4, A2, C4 C3
1989 A4, A2, C4 C3 C4
1990 A4, A2, AW, C4 C3 C4
1991 A4, A2, AW C3 C4, A4
1992 A4, A2, AW C3, C2 C4, C2
Source: Annual reports, Honda, compiled by Mair (1994)
(A— Accord; C  =  Civic; AW =  Accord Wagon; 2,3,4  =  number o f  
doors).




























































































is made on a global basis. Thus in 1988 Honda was the first Japanese 
company to import some cars made in America back to Japan. The 
North American production facilities also supply 28 different coun­
tries, such as Korea and Taiwan, Israel, and Europe (since 1991). For 
instance the Honda Accord Wagon was developed by HRA, manu­
factured by HMA, and is sold in 6 European countries, including the 
UK, France and Germany, through Honda Motor Europe. Exports 
from North America to other regions were planned to almost double 
over the period 1993-94, from 42,000 units to 75,000 units27. Over 
the long-term, the factories will add or drop models according to de­
mand in the different world regions. The domestic country therefore 
does not have exclusivity any longer, to the benefit of a decentralisa­
tion leading to a functioning as a network. The new organisational 
form that is claimed in this study to be emerging is therefore called 
a “network” form.
Table 9. H onda’s ’’Global Supply N etw ork”
P lan t location P ro d u ct
Japan Accord, Prelude, Legend,
Civic, Concerto, Integra, 
Today, City
North America Accord, Civic, Acura
UK Accord, Concerto




Italy, Portugal, Germany, 
Japan, Taiwan 
Israel, Netherlands, UK, 
14 others
All European countries
Source: Annual report, 1994-
The table above shows the flows of product between regions. The 
major production base remains Japan, where almost all models of 
Honda’s range are produced, then sold both locally and abroad. The 
American production base manufactures the Accord and Civic mod­




























































































els, not only for the North American market but also for other mar­
kets, such as markets in Europe and South America. The allocation 
of models to the regional production bases is balanced in that models 
are produced where they are mostly demanded and then sold in other 
regions where some demand exists, thereby exploiting local resources 
and comparative advantage. The Accord model is produced in the 
USA, Europe and Japan: it is a “global-local” model in that the 
basic model (interior, technology) is common to all regions, but the 
exterior and the options may change in each region in order to adapt 
to local consumers needs. Some models are specific to some regions, 
like the Acura model in the USA and the small models Today and 
City in Japan. Similarly, a new European model is to be developed 
specifically for Europe, with some exports if needed.
The American pole is specialised in the Civic and the Accord, which 
are produced only there and exported to Japan and Europe. Honda 
launched a new model specific to the European market at the end 
of 1994. As a result, Honda’s network is extended, enabling a better 
balance of the production of the various Honda models in different 
factories in the world, reducing the cost of overcapacity and allowing 
demand to be met rapidly. Honda has been very successful in the 
USA, because it developed cars specific to the American market. 
Honda cars became very Americanized between 1975 and 1985, both 
in size and styling. As a result, Honda became the fourth largest 
producer in the USA in the late-80s28.
5 .2 .2  T he E u ropean  experience
Europe is a very demanding market in that it is fragmented into many 
national markets. Honda’s approach29 in Europe was cautious: it 
entered through an agreement with a European producer, Rover. The 
agreement with Rover was a partnership based on mutual advantages, 
Rover benefitting from Honda’s efficient system of production, while 
Honda benefitted from Rover’s suppliers and distribution network.
2SMintzberg and Quinn (1993).





























































































This agreement ended in 1994 with the purchase of Rover by BMW 
from BAe. Now Honda is starting to develop models specific for the 
European market.
Another pole for production of the flexible global factory of Honda 
will be East Asia, where Honda has been investing massively in the 
1990s. All Japanese car manufacturers are investing massively in 
South East Asia, and Honda followed the move of its Japanese ri­
vals. South East Asia is attractive for both short-term reasons (re­
action to the move of rivals), and for long-term reasons: this mar­
ket has a strong growth potential since it is still at early phases of 
development30.
In summary, Honda’s organisational form is decentralised. It is divi­
sionalised by regions, the managers of which are delegated not only 
operating decisions, but also strategic decisions, to the extent that 
these concern the local market. Each activity of the regions (R&D, 
marketing, engineering, etc.) is carried out in cooperation with the 
same activities in other regions. Hence communication flows inside 
the organisation are numerous and horizontal (across activities) as 
well as vertical (inside regions and from regions to the head office). 
The autonomy given to regional managers raises the issue of their con­
trol. Since the performance of the divisions (regions) are correlated, 
it is difficult for the coordinator (head office) to distinguish which re­
gional managers performs well or not. The asymmetry of information 
existing between the regional management and the head office may 
result in moral hazard problems, whereby the regional manager does 
not report truly on its division’s performance, which the coordinator 
cannot check. However, the horizontal information flows provide an 
additional monitoring that appears to solve the moral hazard prob­
lem. The director responsible for each product or activity worldwide 
can monitor regional managers. Moreover, the job rotation system 
enables higher levels to assess the ability of a manager, when he 
moves to different activities and different regions. In contrast to 
the traditional hierarchy, career prospects change. Promotion is no
30The average annual growth rate of demand for passenger cars is expected to 
be 3.5 % in Asia, 5.7% in Latin America, 8.8 % in Africa and 9.9% in Eastern 




























































































longer by climbing the vertical ladder, but by accumulating skills and 
experience in job rotation.
Consequently Honda’s organisation seems well fitted to the 1990s 
contradiction, that is the need to be global and local. The network 
of regional factories across the world enables Honda to adjust its mix 
of products to both the regions’ needs and to the cyclical fluctuations 
of demand in the different markets in the world. This flexibility allows 
changes in demand to be detected and then met rapidly.
This organisational form may therefore be the optimal new form to 
adopt in the 1990s. Since both Ford and especially Toyota are also 
changing their organisations to include some of the features of this 
new form, (matrix form at product development level and flatter top 
hierarchy for Ford, decentralisation at Toyota), this might be the or­
ganisational model towards which car manufacturers are converging.
6 The emergence of a new organisational 
form
The change in organisational form resulting from the change in tech­
nology and resulting intensification of competition due to entry, is 
a multiplication of relationships, hence information flows, between 
functions, across product teams and across regions. The number of 
communication nodes is therefore increased, since information flows 
are horizontal (across units in the same hierarchical level) as well as 
vertical (across hierarchical levels). Hence a new organisational form 
can be defined that differs from the traditional vertical hierarchy and 
the multidivisional form. This new form can be called a “network” 
form since it is characterised by units or levels linked to other units 
or levels via different routes. Hence 1 define this as “N-form”, “N” 
standing for network or new. This is represented in the figure be­
low, and is a model of Honda’s organisational structure. The main 
features of this form are:




























































































• a flat top hierarchy;
• incentives based on ability rather than jobs, and job rotation 
rather than climbing the hierarchical ladder;
• decentralisation of local strategic decisions to regional units.
Ford’s organisation has moved towards this new form in that some 
horizontal information flows have been established at product devel­
opment level. However, the large centralisation of decisions on the 










































































































































































































Toyota’s organisation was characterised by horizontal as well as ver­
tical information flows (relationships) from the outset. However, 
its global organisation was very centralised on the headquarters in 
Japan, and has recently started to be decentralised, with some strate­
gic decision (R&D efforts) delegated to American facilities, and with 
the delocalisation of production even inside Japan. The need for 
creativity was recognized and incentives changed accordingly. For 
instance the pressure on workers has been reduced by a reorgani­
sation of assembly lines enabling stocks and by a wage system no 
longer based exclusively on productivity improvements but also on 
skills acquired and teams’ creativity.
Honda is a truly “global-local” organisation. Production is balanced 
across regions, decentralisation enables it to exploit local resources 
while horizontal and vertical information flows enable the head office 
to monitor the regional units, as shown in the figure below.
7 Conclusion
The analysis of the car industry therefore enables us to point out 
some links between firm structure and market structure. The shift 
to the flexible production system provided Japanese automakers with 
a cost advantage that led to their massive entry on American and 
European markets. However, after other producers adopted the new 
technology, Japanese automakers kept an advantage in terms of rate 
of product renewal and time-to-market. Beyond the change in tech­
nology, another factor determined a competitive advantage: the form 
of organisation.
The flexible production system is more a mode of organisation than 
an appropriable technology. At product development level, this leads 
to the matrix form of organisation, and Japanese producers entered 
American and European markets thanks to a cost advantage resulting 
form this new organisation at PD level. At top firm level, there seems 
to be a corresponding optimal organisation, characterised by hori­




























































































rather than to jobs, a flat hierarchy and decentralisation of local 
strategic decisions to regional divisions: the N-forin. The paper lias 
shown that both Ford and Toyota have recently altered their organ­
isation, introducing features that characterised the N-form. Honda 
was shown to be a typical N-form.
Compared with the traditional hierarchy, incentives change. In par­
ticular, promotion is no longer based on an assessment of individual 
performance, but of skills accumulated by rotating jobs in different 
teams and regions in the world. The incentives in the N-form will 
be investigated more precisely in further research. I model incentives 
of divisional managers to share experience in another work (Labory, 
1997a), which could be extended to model job rotation and evaluation 
of skill accumulation. Labory (1997b) formalises the superiority of 
the N-form over the traditional multidivisional form when the flexible 
production system prevails.
The network exists not only inside the firm, but also outside. Car 
companies are linked by many agreements of joint production or joint 
research. These “strategic alliances” constitute another interesting 
topic to study in further research.
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